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When Do Fair Beliefs Infiuence Bargaining
Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan
and the United States
NANCY R. BUCHAN
RACHEL T. A. CROSON
ERIC J. JOHNSON*
In this research, we examine the influence of beliefs about fairness on bargaining
behavior. Using a repeated ultimatum game, we examine bargaining contexts in
Japan and the United States in which buyers' or sellers' fair beliefs are either in
alignment with or in conflict with their own self-interest. We suggest that understanding the relationship between fair beliefs and self-interest is central to understanding when fair beliefs will influence bargaining behavior. Our results demonstrate that fair beliefs predict bargaining behavior when they are aligned with one's
own self-Interest.

N

are common in negotiating—couples often take tums on
choosing the vacation location. Buyers of cars and houses
often feel regretful when they discover that they paid more
than they had to for the item—perhaps reflecting the preference of some automobile shoppers for Satums's no-haggle
policy. Conflicts between firms and dissatisfied consumers
often revolve around the perceived faimess of a transaction.
Our research examines two aspects of faimess and bargaining
behavior. First, we examine factors that infiuence beliefs about
what is fair in a negotiation (such as a shift in market conditions) and how those beliefs differ intemationally. Second,
and more important, we examine when these fair beliefs influence bargaining outcomes. Both of these ideas can be captured in the following scenario;

egotiating a fair deal is an important element in many
transactions; in family decision making (e.g., where
will we go on our next vacation?), in the less formal economy of consumer transactions (such as ticket scalpers or
flea markets), and, of course, in developing economies,
where negotiated prices are the dominant form of price setting for consumer purchases. Yet, even in the United States,
although many purchases are consumer packaged goods for
which we pay posted prices, the largest of consumer purchases are routinely negotiated, such as the purchase of a
house or a car. Many fixed-price transactions are also open
to negotiation. As the New York Titnes recently reported,
bargaining has become more widespread as the economy
has slowed; "With the economy sour and customers holding
on to their wallets, many sellers and buyers say that shoppers
are haggling more—even at sleek SoHo furniture shops and
chain electronics retailers—and getting bigger discounts"
(Pristin and Rohrlich 2002, p. BI).
In all these interactions, perceptions of faimess are thought
to play a critical role. Within the family, faimess arguments

You move to a new city and from a long list of lawn and
garden services, you hire Robert, a well-reputed gardener, to
tend to your yard each week. You negotiate with Robert a fee
for his services that includes his cost of supplies, transportation,
and labor. On the first of each year, you and Robert renegotiate
his fee. In the fall of your third year, the city experiences a
severe economic downturn. Although your own job is quite
secure, you leam that, because of reduced demand, two lawn
and garden services have gone out of business, and thus the
market is now flooded with gardeners looking for work. On
the first of the next year, when it comes time to renegotiate
Robert's fee, you are contemplating what you will offer Robert
and come up with the following options: (a) renegotiate an
increase in Robert's fee, due to market conditions; (b) renegotiate, keeping the same fee; or (c) renegotiate a decrease in
Robert"s fee, due to market conditions.

*Nancy R. Buchan is assistant professor of marketing. University of Wisconsin—Madison. WI 53706; e-mail: Nbuchan@bus.wisc.edu. Rachel T. A.
Croson is associate professor of operations and information management.
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. PA 19104: e-mail: Crosonr@
wharton.upenn.edu. Eric J. Johnson is Norman Eig Professor of Business.
Columbia University. New York, NY 10027: e-mail: Ejj3@columbia.
edu The authors are grateful to David Mick. Dawn lacobucci. the associate
editor and the reviewers for their constructive feedback. The tinancial support
of the U.S. Academy for Educational Development to the first author and of
the National Science Foundation to the second author is gratefully
acknowledged.
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What do you believe is fair? What will you offer Robert on
January 1 ? What do you believe will be the minimum offer
Robert would be willing to accept?
The question of what is fair in negotiation has been the
subject of much research, largely spurred on by Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler's (1986) seminal article demonstrating
that the decision context and frame significantly influence
what people believe to be fair and suggesting that concems
over fairness may influence the behavior of buyers and sellers. Since then, we have gained a deep understanding of a
variety of influences on people's perceptions of faimess,
including the roles they have in the negotiation (Babcock
and Loewenstein 1997), the balance of power between the
negotiating parties (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett 1994), the
cultural orientation of each party (Gelfand et al. 2002), and
their degrees of egocentrism—or self-servingness (Thompson and Loewenstein 1992). A result of these many divergent influences is that parties sitting at the same negotiation
table may have very different ideas about what is the fair
outcome.
In the scenario involving Robert, experimental research
suggests that people from the United States might believe that
reducing Robert's salary is fair. The negotiation is transactional and, since the balance of market power has shifted in
your favor, his compensation should reflect that adjustment
(Dwyer and Walker 1981; Pinkley et al. 1994). Yet, we note
that this outcome is in your (the buyer's) self-interest (in
contrast, increasing Robert's [the seller's] fee would be in
his). Thus, in the United States, there is alignment between
what the buyer believes to be fair (decreased salary) and selfinterest, but for the American seller there is not.
On the other hand, research suggests that people from
Japan are likely to view the negotiation as relational and to
believe that increasing the wage is the fair outcome, since
the more advantaged party in a relationship has the responsibility to take care of the less advantaged party (Doi 1971;
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1993). Note that this outcome is in Robert's (the seller's) self-interest (in contrast,
reducing the fee is in yours [the buyer's]). Thus, in Japan,
for the seller, there is alignment between what is believed
to be fair (increased salary) and self-interest, but for the
buyer there is not.
We have drawn on previous literature discussing fair beliefs to address the question of what might be considered
fair by you and Robert in the negotiation over his fee, yet
we have not provided our expectations for what either of
you will actually do in the negotiation. The reason for this
is that there is surprisingly little evidence of the influence
of faimess on behavior in these settings and that which does
exist is contradictory.
Three previous papers look at the influence of perceptions
of fairness on consumer purchasing behavior. Urbany, Madden, and Dickson (1989) assessed the relationship between
consumer's beliefs about faimess and their behavioral intentions. In support of Kahneman et al.'s predictions, they
found that unjustified automated teller machine (ATM) fee

increases were perceived as unfair, while those justified by
cost increases were acceptable in consumers' eyes. Yet, in
contrast to what intuition would suggest, consumers' fairness beliefs were not significantly related to their reported
purchase intentions. Many who perceived the fee increases
as unfair did not intend to change banks, citing high switching costs, and others who felt the increases to be fair intended
to switch anyway, citing the now higher cumulative cost.
In contrast to these results, Campbell (1999) demonstrated
that perceived unfairness does lead to lower shopping intentions. Specifically, her research suggests that a retailer's
reputation and expected increases in profit influence inferences regarding the motive for a price increase. This motive,
in tum, influences perceived price faimess and intentions to
patronize the retailer.
Finally, the research of Feinberg, Krishna, and Zhang
(2003) demonstrates that consumers' preference for firms is
affected not just by the prices they themselves are offered but
also by the prices available to others. Thus, their model suggests, the cost to the firm of mnning targeted promotions
increases as the proportion of consumers increases who are
aware of and care about the faimess of the price discrepancies.
The goal of this research is to examine the influence of
beliefs about faimess on bargaining behavior. Specifically,
using a repeated ultimatum game, we examine bargaining
contexts in Japan and the United States in which buyers' or
sellers' fair beliefs are eitber in alignment with or in conflict
with their own self-interest. We suggest that understanding
when fair beliefs and self-interest are aligned is central to
understanding when fair beliefs will influence bargaining
behavior.

FAIRNESS IN BARGAINING
The Joumal of Consumer Research has published only
three articles in the past 25 yr. on negotiation. Dwyer (1984)
demonstrated that players in a powerful negotiating position
eamed more than players in a weak position and that the size
of one's own bargaining group tends to amphfy the effects
of power. Schurr and Ozanne (1985) showed that sellers'
expected tmstworthiness plus their toughness in bargaining
led to higher levels of buyer/seller cooperation and of buyer
concessions. Finally, Corfman and Lehmann (1993) demonstrated in computer-simulated negotiations that participants
were primarily concemed about their own payoffs when evaluating satisfaction with the negotiation outcomes and preferred payoffs that were higher than the opponent's payoffs.
Our research seeks to add to this literature for two reasons.
First, negotiation is an important element in our daily lives,
as pointed out in the introduction, and we as marketers have
only a relatively weak understanding of it. Second, the growing importance of international negotiations creates a need
to better understand the relationship between cultural differences in negotiation behavior (Adair, Okamura, and Brett
2001; Graham et al. 1988), distribution mles (Wade-Benzoni
et al. 2002), biases (Gelfand and Christakopoulou 1999),
and faimess judgments (Gelfand et al. 2002),
A common mechanism used to study bargaining and ne-
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gotiation behavior is the ultimatum game (Thaler 1988), In
an ultimatum game, the buyer is given an amount, say, $10,
and is told to divide it in any way he chooses with the seller.
In making the offer, the buyer is stating his reservation price
for consummating the exchange. At the same time, the seller
is told to list the minimum amount (equivalent to the minimum selling price) that he would accept from the buyer to
consummate the exchange. If the buyer's offer is less than
the seller's minimutn demand, the offer is rejected, the
exchange is not consummated, and neither player receives
anything. Standard economic game theory argues that, since
any amount of money is better than no money, the economically rational seller should demand (and the buyer should
offer) the smallest amount over zero (Rubinstein 1982). This
smallest positive amount, e, is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum garne.
Contrary to the equilibrium prediction, buyers tend to
make generous offers—averaging around 40% of the surplus, and sellers in these bargaining games often reject positive offers—the mean rejected offer is about 20% of the
total surplus to be split (Camerer and Thaler 1995). These
deviations from equilibrium have been attributed to concerns
about faimess (Thaler 1988).
But why do people act in this fair manner? Evidence
suggests that there may be at least three explanations; people
might be altmistic and derive utility from higher payoffs of
others; they may believe in reciprocation, thinking that if
they treat others fairly, they will be treated fairly themselves;
or, finally, they may want to avoid the punishment and costs
that might accompany being unfair (Fehr and Gachter 2000;
Pillutla and Murnighan 1995).
The idea that faimess is influenced by altmistic concems,
or by a determination to treat others fairly, has been suggested in a number of bargaining studies, under differing
contexts and even different cultures. For example, the fourcountry study conducted by Roth et al. (1991) shows that
offers in Jemsalem, Ljubljana (in Slovenia), Pittsburgh, and
Tokyo all lay within the range of 40% to 50%, In addition
to the fact that the offers were above the equilibrium (which
suggests a motivation for behavior other than pure selfinterest), the finding that the offers differed across countries
suggested that different culturally influenced beliefs about
faimess may have had an influence on bargaining behavior.
Henrich et al.'s (2001) research comparing ultimatum game
play among participants from 15 small-scale societies
yielded similar and even more extreme conclusions; for example, offers among the Machiguenga tribe in Pem were
26%, while those among the Lamelara in Indonesia were
greater than 50%.
The idea that players are fair for strategic reasons or to
gain reciprocity has also gamered support. Several researchers
have shown that large offers are often motivated by selfinterested concems that small offers will be rejected and that
it is actually more costly to make a small offer because the
probability of rejection is high and the payoff from rejection
is zero (e.g., Prasnikar and Roth 1992). Similarly, Zwick and
Chen (1999) find that the willingness of players to demand
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or offer fairly (often defined as a 50/50 split of the surplus)
is a function of how much it will cost them to do so. Finally,
the work of Komorita and colleagues suggests that, in twoperson and group multistage social dilemmas, the strategy
perceived to be fair in early rounds (in which the powerful
partner demands an equitable distribution of resources) may
need to yield to a distribution of rewards that better reflects
equality in order to gain greater cooperation from a partner
and increased coalition building (Komorita and Nagao 1983;
Komorita, Sheposh, and Braver 1968).
The goal of this research is to examine bargaining behavior in contexts in which buyers' or sellers' fair beliefs
are either in alignment or in conflict with their own selfinterest. We predict that beliefs about faimess will significantly influence bargaining behavior when those beliefs are
aligned with one's own self-interest. Conversely, we predict
that beliefs about fairness will have a much smaller influence
on behavior when they are contrary to self-interest.
To assess the link between fair beliefs and behavior, we
observe behavior in a repeated ultimatum game, and we
measure buyers' and sellers' beliefs about what is a fair
offer or demand. We do this in two bargaining contexts, one
in which the balance of power is relatively equal across
parties, and one in which the buyer has more power than
the seller. Within these contexts, what is believed to be fair
has differing implications for the self-interest of buyers and
sellers. Furthermore, we conduct the bargaining sessions in
two countries, Japan and the United States, where the manipulation of power is expected to differentially influence
fair beliefs across countries. These differing fair beliefs have
differing implications for the alignment of self-interest with
the fair beliefs of each player and for our predictions of
bargaining behavior.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
the next section we discuss the influence of power and culture on beliefs about faimess and propose hypotheses that
predict the influence of such beliefs on subsequent behavior
in the bargaining sessions. The experimental methodology
and the results are then presented, and we conclude with a
discussion of our research contribution and of the avenues
for future research,

HYPOTHESES
The goal of our experiment is to better understand the
relationship between beliefs about faimess and bargaining
behavior. In order to induce and examine variance in fair
beliefs, we vary bargaining power and we examine national
culture. In this section, we first describe these factors and
their hypothesized effects on beliefs about fairness and then
present our main hypotheses conceming the relationship of
the.se beliefs to bargaining behavior.
The use and influence of power in interpersonal and interorganizational relationships has been widely studied by
researchers in a variety of fields (e.g.. Fisher and Ury 1981;
McAIister, Bazerman, and Fader 1986; Thibaut and Kelly
1959), To examine dynamics within the negotiation relationship, many have utilized Emerson's (1964) concept of
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power-dependence; the more dependent A is on B for his
or her outcomes and the more A values those outcomes, the
more power B has over A.
The dependence relationship is typically operationalized
by the existence of an alternative to the current negotiation
for one of the negotiating parties, or in other words, through
the manipulation of the BATNA, the Best Alternative to
Negotiated Agreement (Fisher and Ury 1981). The possession of a BATNA by one of the negotiating parties leads to
greater power. Pinkley et al. (1994) devised a bargaining
setting in which both players had alternatives to negotiation,
which were manipulated at high, medium, and low levels.
The authors find that participants who had higher BATNAs
attained a significantly higher bargaining outcome than those
who had no or poor alternatives. Dwyer and Walker (1981)
found that, when power was asymmetrically distributed in
an experimental setting, the powerful bargainers were able
to achieve agreements that gave them disproportionately
large shares of their groups" total profits, although they show
that the more powerful bargainers are often reluctant to take
full economic advantage of their power.
This research suggests that an alternative to negotiation
translates into greater power for those who possess it. In the
$10 ultimatum game, we will compare bargaining contexts
in which the buyer possesses an alternative to negotiation
equaling 20% of the bargaining surplus (buyer power condition) with contexts in which neither negotiator possesses
an alternative (control condition). This means that, in the
buyer power condition, if the seller rejects the buyer's offer,
the buyer still leaves with $2.00 (his alternative to negotiation) and the seller will leave with nothing. However, in
the control condition, if the seller rejects the buyer's offer,
both the buyer and the seller leave with nothing. We hypothesize the following:
HI: American buyers and sellers will believe it fair to
offer and demand less under the buyer power condition than under the control condition.
In Western countries, power is viewed as being either
coercive or noncoercive (Johnson et al. 1993). The Japanese
perspective of power, however, is much more relational. The
Japanese relate to social power in a paternalistic context, as
a sign of authority or a nurturing influence (Frazier and Rody
1991). Hence, whereas Western views focus on the action
and outcomes related to the power source, Japanese views
concentrate more on the type of negotiation relationship. In
essence, from the perspective of Japanese culture, power is
captured in the relationship between the negotiators. For
Western cultures, power relates to the outcomes and ends
of the negotiation.
Psychologist Takeo Doi (1971) suggests that, in Japan,
the societal norm of amae dictates that the more powerful
party is responsible, in part, for the well being of the less
powerful. Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993) have
documented the pervasiveness of amae (what they describe
as benevolent leadership) in personal as well as business
relationships. This suggests that, in the buyer power con-

dition of our experiment, there will exist the expectation by
the less powerful party (the seller) and the acceptance of
responsibility by the more powerful party (the buyer) that
the seller is to be taken care of by the buyer. Therefore, in
Japan, we hypothesize the following infiuence of power on
fair beliefs:
H2: Japanese buyers and sellers will believe it fair to
offer and demand more in the condition in which
the buyer has greater power than in the control
condition.
Having made our predictions about the influence of power
on the fair beliefs of Japanese and American buyers and
sellers, we turn to discussing the likely impact of these
beliefs on behavior. To do so, we examine whether the fair
beliefs of buyers and sellers are aligned with or conflict with
their self-interest.
The main premise of this research is that, when fair beliefs
are aligned with self-interest, we will see a significant influence of fair beliefs on bargaining behavior. Conversely,
when fair beliefs conflict with self-interest, we predict that
fair beliefs will not have a significant influence on behavior.
In the United States, in the buyer power condition, hypothesis 1 suggests that buyers will believe it fair to make
low offers. Making low offers is in the buyers' self-interest.
Given this alignment of fair beliefs and self-interest, we
hypothesize:
H3a: Fair beliefs will significantly influence American
buyers' offers.
In the United States, in the buyer power condition, hypothesis 1 suggests that sellers will believe it is fair to make
low demands. However, demanding a lower amount of money
conflicts with the seller's self-interest. Given this conflict between fair beliefs and self-interest, we hypothesize:
H3b: Fair beliefs will not significantly influence American sellers' demands.
In Japan, in the buyer power condition, hypothesis 2 suggests that buyers will believe it fair to make high offers.
However, making high offers conflicts with the buyers' selfinterest. Given this conflict between fair beliefs and self-interest, we hypothesize:
H4a: Fair beliefs will not significantly influence Japanese buyers' offers.
In Japan, in the buyer power condition, hypothesis 2 suggests that sellers will believe it fair to make high demands.
Making high demands is in the sellers' self-interest. Given
this alignment of fair beliefs and self-interest, we hypothesize:
H4b: Fair beliefs will significantly influence Japanese
sellers' demands.
To summarize these propositions, for American buyers,
faimess beliefs and self-interest suggest that offers will be
lower under the buyer power condition. For American sell-
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ers, faimess beliefs imply that demands also would be lower
in the buyer power condition, but this goes against the
seller's self-interest in making higher demands. For Japanese
buyers, faimess beliefs suggest that buyers make higher offers when they have more power, but this contrasts with the
self-interested desire of buyers to make more money and
thus make lower offers. For Japanese sellers, fairness beliefs
and self-interest suggest that demands will be higher in the
buyer power condition.
The alignment of fairness beliefs and self-interest for
American buyers and Japanese sellers suggests a high correlation between fair beliefs and bargaining behavior, and a
low proportion of participants behaving unfairly. For American sellers and Japanese buyers, the behavior implied by
fairness beliefs under the condition of buyer power is not
aligned with self-interest. This nonalignment suggests a low
correlation between fair beliefs and bargaining behavior and
a high proportion of participants behaving unfairly.

EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The intemational character of this research warranted that
we control for culture or country-specific variables that
could influence our results. Specifically, we addressed the
following issues, as sugge.sted by Roth et al. (1991): subject
pool equivalency, currency effects, language effects, experimenter effects, and comprehension of the experimental task.
These issues are addressed in the appendix.
A total of 168 undergraduate students from Tokyo University and the University of Pennsylvania participated in this
exf>eriment as part of an introductory marketing course requirement and for any actual eamings from the negotiation.
The experiment is a mixed design with Country (United
States vs. Japan) and Power (control vs. buyer power) as
between-subjects factors and the 10 rounds of play as a
within-subjects factor. We rescaled offers and demands
across countries to a common 0-1,000 scale, where one unit
equals I cent or 2 yen. On this scale, the buyer's alternative
to negotiation was worth 200 units ($2.00 or 400 yen).
The experimental procedure was as follows: participants
were designated roles of buyer or seller and negotiated for
10 rounds with different anonymous partners each round.
In each round, buyers recorded their maximum offer, while
sellers simultaneously recorded the minimum demand they
were willing to accept. If the offer equaled or exceeded the
seller's minimum demand, the seller would accept the offer
and the transaction was completed: if the buyer's offer was
less than the seller's demand, the seller rejected the offer
and no deal was made, leaving both the buyer and the seller
with nothing.
Next, participants completed questions regarding their fair
beliefs (i.e.. What do you believe was the fair [offer] demand?) and power (i.e.. To what extent do you feel that you
had more power than the buyer [seller]? [ 1 = 1 had less to
7 = I had more power]). At the conclusion of the experiment, one of the 10 rounds was chosen at random, and
participants were paid their earnings for that round.
We test the efficacy of the power manipulation within
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each country using a 2(Role) x 2(Power) analysis of variance design. We expect buyers to rate themselves as having
more power in the buyer power condition than in the control
condition and sellers to rate themselves as having more
power in the control condition than in the buyer power
condition. The power manipulation was effective in each
country, as demonstrated by a significant role by power
interaction (in the United States, F(l,81) = 16.45, p<
.01, in Japan. F(l,81) = 4.25,/? < .05): these results support the underlying explanations for hypotheses 1 and 2.

EXPERIMENT 1: ANALYSIS AND
RESULTS
Given that our manipulation of power was effective in both
countries, we now test for the influence of that manipulation
on what participants believed to be the fair offer or the fair
demand. As expected, what Americans believe are fair offers
and fair demands are lower in the buyer power condition than
in the control condition. Thus hypothesis 1 is supported
(/'huyers(1.41) = 3.85, /7 < .05; F,,,,^J1,39) = 3.81, p<
.05). Furthermore, as expected, what Japanese participants
believe to be fair offers and demands are higher in the buyer
power condition than in the control condition, supporting hypothesis 2 (F,^^,,(l,42) = 8.06, /7<.O1: /;„„,,( 1,39) =
5.51, p < .Q\). The results of these analyses are shown in
table 1. These results suggest that there is divergence across
countries as to what is believed to be fair in these negotiations.
Given that our manipulation of power was effective and
our hypotheses conceming the influence of power on fair
beliefs are supported, we take the next step of assessing the
link between buyer power and bargaining behavior. We conduct this analysis in two phases. First, we examine the influence of power on Japanese and American offers and demands. We then conduct mediation analyses to determine if
the influence of power on behavior is mediated by beliefs
about fairness. Our proposition conceming the relationship
between beliefs and behavior will be supported if we find
that fair beliefs mediate the influence of power on American
offers and Japanese demands but not on American demands
and Japanese offers.
We analyze the behavioral data from the 10 bargaining
sessions employing four analyses of variance where buyer
power is the independent variable. Our dependent variables
are average offers and demands in each country; similar
results are produced when using offers or demands from
round 1. or round 10. or when employing repeated measures
ANOVAs. From table 2, it is apparent that the introduction
of buyer power significantly influenced offers and demands
in each country. American offers were significantly lower
in the buyer power condition {F(\,A\) = 3.83, p < .05),
while American demands were also lower but the influence
was weakly significant (F( 1,39) = 2.12./?< .10). Japanese
offers were significantly lower in the buyer power condition,
(F(l,42) = 8.78,/?< .01), but Japanese demands were significantly higher (f( 1,39) = 3.92. p < . 0 5 ) .
In a mediation analysis using the method suggested by
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TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF BUYER POWER ON FAIR BELIEFS

American buyers' average fair offers
SD
n
American sellers' average fair demands
SD
n
Japanese buyers' average fair offers
SD
n
Japanese sellers' average fair demands
SD

Control condition

Buyer power condition

F-statistic

448.75
48.98
20
467.50
73.02
20
476.25
33.43

382.86
142.53

3.85-

22
449.74
62.37

19

21
417.10
92.06
19
518.25
59.92
20
497.25
63.96
20

3.818.06*
5.51*

NOTE.—Fair offers and demands are measured on a scale of 0-1,000 units. For example, for American participants, an offer of $2.00 = 200 units, an offer of
$5.00 = 500 units. For Japanese participants, an offer of 400 yen = 200 units, an offer of 1 000 yen = 500 units, n = number of participants.
•p < .05.

Baron and Kenny (1986), we expect that the influence of
power on American offers and Japanese demands will be
mediated by fairness beliefs, because such beliefs are aligned
with self-interest. Conversely, we expect to find no mediation of power by fair beliefs in the cases of American sellers
and Japanese buyers, where fair beliefs are in contrast with
self-interest.
We now analyze the correlations between fair beliefs and
bargaining behavior. The correlations between the fair beliefs and actual offers of American buyers (r = .47) and
the fair beliefs and actual demands of Japanese sellers
(;• = .45) are both significant at the p < .01 level. The correlations between the fair beliefs and actual offers of Japanese buyers (/• = —.19) and the fair beliefs and actual
demands of American sellers {/• = .26) are not significant.
Given this lack of correlation, we know that beliefs about
faimess will not mediate the influence of power on Japane.se
buyer offers and American sellers' demands.
However, given the signiflcant levels of correlation found
for American buyers and Japanese sellers, we proceed with
the mediation analyses by adding fair beliefs as a covariate
in the original ANOVA models. For American buyers and
Japanese sellers, the influence of power on offers is fully
mediated by fair beliefs. Once fair beliefs are entered first
as covariates in the model, the influence of power becomes
insignificant (f"(l,41) = 2.04), NS), and the infiuence of
fair beliefs emerges as strongly significant (f(l,41) =
8.60, p< .0\). For Japanese sellers, also, the influence of
power (F( 1,39) = .51), NS) is fully mediated by fair beliefs
(F(l,39) = 24.61,/?<.01).
Taken together, these mediation results fully support the
proposition laid out in this re.search. When fair beliefs are
aligned with self-interest (as in the case of American buyers
[hypothesis 3a] and Japanese sellers [hypothesis 4bl), there
exists a strong and significant influence of fairness on behavior. When fair beliefs are in contrast to self-interest (as
in the case of Japanese buyers [hypothesis 4a] and American

sellers [hypothesis 3b]), fair beliefs do not exert a significant
influence on bargaining behavior.
Table 3 summarizes our results. In this table, the phrase
in each cell provides our prediction regarding the belief of
fairness or power and behavior, and the footnote attached
indicates the degree to which our prediction was confirmed
(absence of a footnote symbol indicates that the outcome
was not statistically significant). Our results demonstrate that
faimess norms conceming power operate differently in Japan and the United States; Americans believe it fair that the
more powerful party take the lion's share of the wealth,while
Japanese believe it fair that the more powerful party share
the wealth with the less powerful. The relationship of these
fair beliefs to self-interest is positive in the case of American
buyers and Japanese sellers. Among these two groups, we
indeed find bargaining behavior that is consistent with these
fair beliefs, and we find that fair beliefs mediate behavior.
Among the other groups, where fair beliefs are in conflict
with self-interest, fair beliefs have no correlation with bargaining behavior. The proportion of participants behaving
unfairly (e.g., the proportion of American sellers whose actual demand was higher than the demand they believed to
be fair) is highest in those instances where fair beliefs conflict with self-interest.

DISCUSSION
We believe that the primary contribution of our research
is that we extend the literature on negotiations by not only
examining what influences fair beliefs but also by examining
when those fair beliefs influence bargaining behavior. Specifically, we examine fairness beliefs in the United States
and Japan under varying conditions of buyer power, and we
find a significant power by country interaction, consistent
with our hypotheses. In the United States, participants believe that it is fair that the party with greater power takes
a larger share of the surplus. In Japan, participants believe
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TABLE 2

ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF BUYER POWER ON BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

American buyers' average offer
SD
n
American sellers' average demand
SD
n
Japanese buyers' average offer
SD
n
Japanese sellers's average demand
SD
n

Control condition

Buyer power condition

F-statistic

448.25
52.40
20
384.61
126.27
20
508.02

399.74
107.33

3.83-

48.11

61.89
20
435.95
60.47
20

22
390.35
75.67
19

21

332.71
109.22
19
457.56

2.12
8.78*
3.92*

NOTE,—Fair offers and demands are measured on a scale of 0-t ,000 units. For example, for American participants, an offer of $2.00 = 200 units, and offer
of $5.00 = 500 units. For Japanese participants, an offer of 400 yen = 200 unit, and offer of 1,000 yen = 500 units.
*p<.05.

that it is fair that the party with greater power earns a smaller
portion of the surplus, sharing more of it with the weaker
partner.
This finding of divergent beliefs about faimess leads to
our most important result. In the ultimatum bargaining scenarios presented here, the tension between faimess and selfinterest is transparent, and it allowed us to clearly discern
the influence of faimess beliefs versus self-interest on negotiation behavior. We demonstrate that, when participants'
beliefs about fairness are aligned with self-interest, what is
believed to be fair has a significant influence on bargaining
behavior, fully mediating the influence of power in the negotiation. In contrast, when participants' beliefs about fairness conflict with self-interest, fairness beliefs do not have
a significant infiuence on bargaining behavior.
Although research across a number of fields has provided
us with a deep understanding of the many factors that influence the formation of faimess beliefs, our results demonstrate that the infiuence of such beliefs on actual bargaining behavior is not always certain. In fact, this research
suggests that self-interest is an extremely powerful motivator
in negotiation; only when fairness beliefs are aligned with
self-interest does behavior mirror those beliefs.
Our results indicate the importance of understanding the
relationship between the impiications of one's fairness beliefs and self-interest, and in doing so, they support the lack
of correspondence in fair beliefs and intentions found by
Urbany et al. (1989) and the demonstration of cost concems
as a powerful influence on bargaining behavior forwarded
by Zwick and Chen (1999). For example, even when the
consumer in the Urbany et al. experiment believed his bank's
fee increases were fair, the higher cumulative costs from
patronizing tbat bank conflicted with his self-interest and
the customer often left.
Our results also demonstrate that national culture interacts
with power to yield differing beliefs about what is fair
among buyers and sellers in Japan versus those in the United
States. Note that both players (buyers and sellers) in each

country shared the same beliefs about faimess. Empirical
research in negotiation demonstrates that the presence of a
joint notion of outcome faimess among the negotiating parties weakens zero-sum perceptions (Thompson 1998),
speeds up concession making, and increases the likelihood
that the agreement will be accepted and enforced (Albin
1993; Mannix, Neale, and Northcraft 1995). Our results suggest an even more fundamental issue. Even if both parties
share the same beliefs about faimess (e.g., both Japanese
buyers and sellers believed it fair for the buyer to make high
offers in the buyer power condition in our experiment), this
does not mean that both players will behave in accordance
with that belief. These results suggest that further study is
needed to understand when jointly shared beliefs about fairness will positively influence the behavior of both parties
and the relationship and when the pull of self-interest is
likely to serve as an impediment to the benefits of that shared
norm.
We acknowledge that there are limitations to the work
done here. For example, it is possible that other relationships
exist among the concepts studied here (power, faimess, and
behavior), not necessarily in the order or contingencies proposed. In addition, there may be concems about when the
measures are taken in the experiment; measuring faimess
after the behavior makes it possible that faimess is a function
of offers and demands rather than the other way around. It
is true that the fairness measures were collected after the
bargaining session; however, we considered this a stronger
test of our hypotheses than measures collected before bargaining (which could severely taint the behavior observed
as people try to be fair). If indeed bargaining outcomes
caused faimess perceptions, then we should see positive
relationships between fair beliefs and offers/demands in both
countries across both roles. Instead, we saw positive relationships only where hypothesized.
There are ample avenues for future research in this area.
For example, we might extend the self-serving biases literature (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997) by examining
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TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS: PREDICTIONS AND FINDINGS
Japanese participants

American participants
Buyers
Generally, self-interest is
enhanced with . . .
When buyers have more
power, fairness norms
imply . . .
Correlation between
actual and perceived
"fair" offers/demands
Actual offers/demands
when buyers have
more power. . .
Proportion of participants
behaving unfairly in the
buyer power condition

Sellers

Buyers

Sellers

Lower offers

Highier demands

Lower offers

Higher demands

Lower offers*

Lower demands*

Higher offers*

Higher demands*

Positive and significant*

Not significant

Not significant

Positive and significant*

Lower offers*

Higher demands*

Lower offers*

Higher demands*

Low (.23)

High (.65)

Higfi (.55)

Low (.26)

•Confirmed, p<.10.
*Confirmed, p<.05.

whether fairness beliefs taken before participants are assigned a role differ from those taken when participants know
that they will be playing the role of buyer or seller, and then
looking at the relationship of both of these measurements
to actual behavior. We also might examine more deeply the
issue of the cost of being fair and look at which types of
costs mitigate the role of faimess in bargaining and by how
much. The experimental situations in this research presented
very conservative tests of faimess; it would be informative
to study conditions (such as ones that provide the opportunity for reputation building) where self-interest may be
more costly and fairness would be more likely to flourish.
Lest our focus on the self-interested behavior of individuals has left readers feeling that we are headed for some
nasty, brutish, and short Hobbesian existence, it is important
to note that, even though players did not always behave in
accordance with their faimess beliefs, neither did they act
in accordance with equilibrium play. In the buyer power
condition, for example, average buyer offers hovered around
450 units and average seller demands were approximately
375 units. Although we have shown that concerns for fairness do not always serve as a constraint on profit seeking,
bargainers in our experiment demonstrated that the purely
rational behavior predicted by standard economic theory
also has its limits.
We hope that future research will continue to investigate
the issue of faimess and, more specifically, will focus on
the relationships between fair beliefs, self-interest, and bargaining behavior. Regardless, we expect that, as once described to the first author, economists will keep trying to
figure out why people are not more selfish and psychologists
will keep trying to figure out why people are as selfish as
they are.

APPENDIX
CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIMENTAL
CONTROLS
Controlling for Subject Pool Equivalency. We controlled
for equivalency in educational background and knowledge
of economics among the participant populations in three
ways; First, the universities chosen for the experiment were
both top tier universities in their countries. Second, participants were all sophomore or junior economics or business
undergraduate students and were paid for their eamings in
the experiment. Third, participants were questioned as to
their level of exposure to economic theory and to game
theory in particular. Although, answers to these questions
were entered as covariates in the final analysis of results,
they were not significant.
Cotttrolling for Currency Effects. To control for differences in the numerical scale on which payments were made
(i.e., single dollars vs. thousands of yen), proposed offers
and demands in each country were made first in terms of
dollars or yen, and also in terms of 1,000 tokens, in increments of five tokens. As in previous multicountry experiments, we controlled for purchasing power parity by choosing denominations such that monetary incentives relative to
participant income and living standards would be approximately equal across countries.
Controlling for Language Effects. To control for any nuances in language that may afiFect results across countries,
instructions for the experiments in Japan were translated into
Japanese and back-translated into English using separate
extemal translators.
Controlling for E.xperimenter Effects. Similar to the measures taken by Roth et al. (1991) to control for individual

FAIR BELIEFS AND BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

differences in the manner in which the experiment was conducted across countries, the same bilingual experimenter
conducted all conditions of the experiment in both countries.
Controlling for Comprehettsion of E.xperimental Task. To
be certain that participants in each country understand the
experimental task, after reading through the instmctions but
prior to engaging in the actual task, participants completed
a series of comprehension checks. Experiment monitors
checked the answers of each student before the experiment
was allowed to proceed.
[DaH7i lacobucci ser\'ed as editor for this article.]
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